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CONTROLLING INTERESTS—
DISCOUNT FOR LACK OF
MARKETABILITY:
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
By R o n a ld D. D iM a ttia , C PA , A B V , CM A

OVERVIEW
Some leading practitioner-authors
have questioned whether a discount
for lack of marketability should be
applied when valuing controlling
ownership interests. A lthough the
logical argum ents are strong that
controlling ownership interests lack
marketability, no empirical studies
have been cited as support—unlike
m inority ow nership interests, for
which such studies are numerous.
This article analyzes the concept of
m arketability generally and as it
applies to c o n tro llin g ow nership
interests. It then identifies an area of
academic research, merger arbitrage,
which has been widely examined and
includes a number of empirical stud
ies. The conceptual underpinnings of
merger arbitrage are described and
are found to be quite similar to the
lack of marketability concept for con
trolling ownership interests. Empiri
cal evidence from certain studies is
then cited and offered as an indicator
of the lack of marketability for con
trolling ownership interests. Areas for
further research are also identified.

GENERAL THEORY

AICPA

The concept of a discount for lack of
marketability in valuing privately held

business ownership interests is well
established in modern valuation the
ory. It can be a crucial aspect in the
valuation of the stock of a privately
held company because many valuation
methods used by appraisers result in a
marketable indication of value. That
result is due to the underlying market
data that appraisers use in the income
and market approaches. These data
are derived from publicly traded com
panies. It is generally accepted that
appraisers should consider whether
the interest being valued is nonmar 
ketable, and if a discount for lack of
marketability should be applied.
The concept of marketability cen
ters on the ease with w hich the
holder of a stock ownership interest
can convert the security to cash in
terms of timing, the reliability of real
izing the quoted proceeds, and trans
action costs. The authors of Valuing a
Business put it better, as follows:
In this text, we will define m ar
ketability as the ability to convert
the business ownership interest (at
whatever ownership level) to cash
quickly, with minimum transaction
an d ad m inistrative costs in so
doing and with a high degree of
certainty of realizing the expected
amount of net proceeds.1

1 Shannon Pratt, Robert F. Reilly, and Robert P. Schweihs, Valuing a Business, 4th ed (New York: McGraw-Hill,
2000), p. 393.
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T he gen eral sta n d a rd against
which marketability is measured is
stocks that are actively traded on pub
lic exchanges. When the owners of a
stock are unable to quickly liquidate
their ownership position, they are
exposed to significantly greater risk
th an stockholders of a com pany
traded on a public exchange. The
owners of an illiquid security cannot
react quickly to developments in the
specific company they have an invest
ment in, or to developments in the
broader market. Studies have shown
that, because investors are risk averse,
they apply a considerable discount to
stocks that are not freely tradable.
It is widely accepted th at m ar
ketability is affected by a variety of
factors inclu d in g the com pany’s
num ber of shareholders, financial
stability and volatility of earnings,
concentration of ownership inter
ests, capabilities of management, size
of the block of stock being valued,
required holding period, restrictions
on transfers, size of the company,
and dividend-distribution policy.
The Court ruling in Bernard Mandel
baum, et al v. Commissioner (TCM
1995-255) provides an ex cellen t
analysis of the discrete factors affect
ing the marketability of a minority
ownership interest.
Much of the work that valuation
practitioners conduct involves mea
suring the fair m arket value of a
minority ownership interest in a pri
vately held company. So it is no sur
prise that the empirical studies of

m ark etab ility have focused on
minority ownership interests. The
m ost widely used studies can be
divided into two general categories:
1. Studies of discounts on sales of
re stric te d shares of publicly
traded companies
2. Studies of discounts on sales of
closely held shares relative to the
subsequent initial public offering
price per share.
Both groups of studies contain a
thorough body of research which
consistently suggests a general range
of discount from 20%-60% to reflect
a minority equity interest’s lack of
marketability in a privately held com
pany, with a rough average being
30%-45%.
It is also widely accepted among
valuation practitioners th at m ar
ketability has a fairly close relation
ship with the level of ownership con
trol. It is generally assumed that the
higher the level of control, the lower
the level of marketability discount
(all else held constant), as illustrated

T here is disagreem ent am ong
practitioners, however, regarding
the lack of marketability associated
w ith c o n tro llin g in te re s ts . P ut
a n o th e r way, some p ractitio n ers
believe that the line in the preced
ing graph should intersect zero at
some p o in t along the ow nership
continuum . Some leading practi
tioner-authors state that no empiri
cal evidence supports the claim that
con tro llin g interests in privately
held companies lack marketability,
and that if any lack of marketability
does exist, it is c a p tu re d in the
calculated valuation result.2 Some
p ractitioners do believe th at the
lack of m arketability is reflected
in th e v a lu a tio n re s u lt w hen a
m erger and acquisition valuation
m ethod is utilized under the mar
ket approach. Well-known authors,
however, seem to agree that a dis
count for lack of m arketability is
re q u ir e d w ith th e m e rg e r an d
acquisition m ethod.3
It would seem that most practi
tioners believe that despite the lack
of empirical evidence, it is only log
ical that a controlling interest in a
privately held company would be
illiquid, regardless of the level of
o w n ersh ip in te re s t, even 100%
ownership. The illiquidity related
to a c o n tro llin g in te re s t w ould
derive principally from the factors
described in the following p a ra 
graphs based on the discussion of
them by Pratt, Reilly, and Schweihs
in Valuing a Business, 4th edition.4

James R. Hitchner, Financial Valuation: Applications and Models, 2nd edition (NewJersey: Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2006), pp. 391-392 (summarizing the controversy).
Shannon P. Pratt, The Market Approach to Valuing Businesses, (NewJersey: Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2000), 154-155, and Hitchner, pp. 268-269.
4 Shannon Pratt, Robert F. Reilly, and Robert P. Schweihs, Valuing a Business, 4th ed (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2000), pp. 411-416.
2
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• Time horizon risk. T he rule of
thumb among investment bankers
and business brokers is that it can
take, on average, 9-12 months to
sell a small, privately held com
pany. The process includes draft
ing marketing materials, identify
ing potential buyers, contacting
buyers, holding preliminary discus
sions, negotiating letters of intent,
conducting due diligence proce
dures including appraisals and
EPA reports, negotiating the for
mal purchase agreement, and clos
ing the transaction.
— O ffsetting time horizon risk
w ould be the in te rim cash
flows an investor could expect
as a result of the com pany’s
dividend or distribution policy.
• Price risk (a). There are two ele
ments to price risk. The first risk
is actually realizing the quoted
proceeds. Estimates of value for
privately held enterprises can vary
widely, and for some enterprises,
th e re is a serious q u estio n
whether they can be sold at all.
Business brokers and investment
bankers seem to believe that for
any given transaction there is a
very small probability of success.
Business brokerage industry arti
cles note th at only one in five
companies that are listed for sale
is actually sold, and that 50% of
deals that make it to the letter of
intent stage fail.5
• Price risk (b). The second element
of risk is the form that the pur
chase price will take. Considera
tion paid for a privately h eld
enterprise is rarely all cash and
often includes risky contingent
consideration. Transaction cur
rencies (cash vs. seller notes vs.
earn-outs) would seem to exhibit
a cyclical nature, varying in pro
portion depending on the health

CPA E xpert

of the overall financial markets.
Both risks d iffer dram atically
from that associated with the sale
of publicly traded entities.
— To the extent a valuation ana
lyst considers price risk effects
in a valuation (by reducing the
value conclusion or stating it as
a range), it would not be nec
essary to include such consid
erations in estim ating a dis
count for lack of marketability.
The difficulty is that price risk
effects are driven as much by
the characteristics of buyers
generally and the econom ic
o u tlo o k as they are by the
attributes of the valuation sub
ject. As a result it may be more
effective to consider price risk
w ithin the co n tex t of a dis
count for lack of marketability
than to consider it separately.
• Transaction costs. Many valuation
practitioners believe that transac
tion costs should not be taken into
account in determining the value
of an ownership interest. However,
it is the relative difference in trans
action costs, compared to a rele
vant base, which concerns valua
tion analysts because costs have an
im pact on proceeds. Costs for
attorneys, accountants, investment
bankers, and environmental con
sultants and o th e r fees and
expenses can be quite high (10%
or more) for a small privately held
company. It would seem that the
concept of “economies of scale”
would apply to acquisitions of own
ership interests as well. Valuation
analysts generally consider the
effect of transaction costs when a
significant relative difference in
costs is expected.
Although the logical arguments in
support of a discount for lack of mar
ketability for controlling interests are

strong, no empirical data have been
cited to date in support of it as there
is with minority ownership interests.6
Many practitioners assume that the
level of marketability discount should
be lower with controlling interests
th an with m inority in terests (as
depicted in the chart accompanying
this article), and generally settle on a
discount of 20% or less.7 It is the
absence of empirical evidence that
lies at the h e a rt of the o ngoing
debate about discounts for lack of
marketability for controlling interests
in privately held companies.

MERGER ARBITRAGE-EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE
The concept of merger arbitrage has
been established in the financial
community for decades and can be
defined as it is in the following para
graph taken from a Working Paper,
“Merger Arbitrage: Evidence of Prof
itability” by Taewon Yang and Ben
Branch8:
Merger arbitrage specialists invest
in com panies involved in a
m erger or an acquisition. In an
acquisition situation, the manager
will usually go long the stock of
the company being acquired and
short the stock of the acquiring
company. The stock of the com
pany being acquired will in gen
eral trade at a discount since all
acquisitions take time and there
always is a risk that the acquisition
will not be com pleted. M erger
arbitrage funds make investment
profits when they successfully
a n tic ip a te th e outcom e of an
announced m erger and capture
the spread between the current
m arket price and the price at
which the stock will be trading
after the merger is completed.
So once a merger or acquisition
of a publicly tra d e d com pany is
announced, the target’s stock price

5 “Why Your Business Won’t Sell!” Article ID: 116; “Tips on Avoiding the Deal Breakers,” Article ID: 35 by Business Brokers Press, available online at California Association
of Business Brokers (www.cabb.org).
6 Hitchner, p. 377; Exhibit 8.2; p. 392.
7 Ibid., p. 392.
8 University of Massachusetts, Isenberg School of Management Working Paper, pp. 1-2 (airtdatabase.com/research/pdffiles/article2taiwonandbranch.pdf).
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reacts and tends to rise near to, but
generally lower than, the announced
acquisition price. There seems to be
general agreement that the differen
tial in price arises because there is a
meaningful lapse between the time
the deal is first announced and when
it eventually closes, as described in
the following excerpt from another
working paper, “Expanding the Lim
its of Merger Arbitrage” by Eliezer
Fich and Irina Stefanescu:9
Because the purchase and tender
of target shares do not occur simul
taneously, risk arises in at least two
different ways. First, while the deal
is still pending, there is a risk that it
will fail. In this situation the target’s
price will likely fall, and the arbi
trageur will suffer substantial losses.
Second, arbitrageurs may require
capital to finance the purchase of
target shares while the deal is pend
ing. Thus, even if the m erger is
completed, financing may put prof
its at risk....
An announced m erger or acquisi
tion could fail as a result of a variety
of issues including the following:
• The target’s performance could
slip, causing the buyer to re-evalu
ate the price or the entire deal.
• The buyer’s performance could
change, m aking it unlikely to
close the deal.
• G eneral econom ic conditions
could change, such as unantici
pated movements in interest rates
that make deal financing unat
tractive.
• Dynamics within either the buyer’s
or target’s industries could change,
such as a strike against or bank
ruptcy of a major supplier.
• Financial markets could experi
ence a shock, a recent and vivid
exam ple being the “subprim e”
debacle.
• Regulators could rule that the
deal is anticompetitive and cause

the terms to be altered or force it
into a lengthy litigation.
— Such regulations apply to even
relatively small transactions as
a re su lt of the H art-ScottR odino A n titru st Im prove
ments Act of 1976.
• Unexpected information about a
target could come to light causing
the buyer to reconsider.
The linkage between studies of
merger arbitrage and an analysis of
discounts for lack of marketability
for controlling ownership interests is
compelling. The similarities between
these public m erger transactions
(for which there is substantial avail
able data) and private acquisitions of
controlling interests (for which there
is very little available data) are
strong. They are as follows:
• Both represent the acquisition of
a controlling ownership interest.
• Both require a substantial period
of time to complete.
• As a result of the lengthy time to
complete, both are subject to a
meaningful level of deal failure for
which investors seek protection.

ELAPSED TIME
As noted previously the ability to liq
uidate a position in a stock quickly is
a key determinant of marketability. A
recen t p aper by Ben Branch and
Taewon Yang studied 185 “collar”
merger offers from 1993-2003.10 The
authors found that the average dura
tion of public collar m erger offers
was 139 days. The working paper by
Eliezer Fich and Irina Stefanescu
cited earlier, “Expanding the Limits
of Merger Arbitrage,”11studied 1,928
cash and stock mergers and acquisi
tions from 1985-2000 and found that
the average transaction duration was
about 4.5 months (although table 1
of that paper lists the average dura
tion as 94 days, or about 3 months).

As we stated earlier, the rule of
thumb among business brokers and
investment bankers is that the sale of
a privately held company requires a
significantly longer period of time
than the period cited in the studies
previously m entioned. The rule of
thumb period is between 9 and 12
m onths, sometimes longer than a
year, depending on m arket condi
tions. However, it is unclear at this
point whether private transactions
do, in fact, take longer to consum
m ate—from b eg in n in g to e n d —
than do public transactions. Before a
p ublic m erg e r o r a cq u isitio n is
announced, a significant amount of
due diligence has already occurred,
which is facilitated by Securities and
Exchange Commission disclosure
re q u ire m e n ts. So a lth o u g h the
elapsed time from announcement to
closing approximates 4.5 months for
public transactions, it is quite possi
ble that the time from initial explo
ration of a merger or sale to closing
approximates the rule of thumb for
privately held companies. It would
appear that the oft-cited business
brokers’ rule of thumb starts when
the broker is first hired, prior to
preparing the initial due diligence
package and contacting buyers.12
From the perspective of elapsed
time, it would appear that public
m ergers and acq u isitio n s could
exhibit similar characteristics to pri
vate mergers and acquisitions, but
further research is required to con
firm this belief.

TRANSACTION FAILURE RISK
Merger arbitrage studies also provide
insights regarding another element
of marketability—certainty of realiz
ing the quoted proceeds. Because of
the lengthy period of time necessary
to close a merger/acquisition, there
are a num ber of reasons why the
transaction m ight ultim ately fall
apart. Data regarding the potential

9 Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Working Paper, May 18, 2003, p. 5. (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=410600)
10 “Merger Deal Structures and Investment Strategies,” TheJournal ofAlternative Investments, Winter 2006, Exhibit 4.
11 Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill Working Paper, May 18, 2003, p. 12.
12 “How Long Does it Take?” Business Brokerage Press (www.bbpinc.com/articlesdetail.asp?id=27).
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for an announced transaction to fail
are also well-documented.
In their working paper, “Expand
ing the Limits of Merger Arbitrage,”
Eliezer Fich and Irina Stefanescu
found that nearly 23% of the deals in
th eir study failed .13 A dditionally,
Micah Officer studied 4,593 merger
or tender offer bids over the period
1985-2004 and found that between
l7%-22% of the transactions in his
study failed.14
Given the research, transaction
failu re risk is n o t in sig n ifican t.
In te restin g ly , th e Fich an d Ste
fanescu paper also found that the
risk of deal failure was significantly
hig h er for sm aller acquirers, de
fined as those not included in the
Standard & Poor’s 500 index. They
found that roughly 9% of transac
tions failed when the bid d er was
part of the S&P 500. However, the
failure rate jum ps to 26% when the
b id d e r is n o t in c lu d e d in the
index.15 Because the acquirer of a
smaller privately held company is
more likely to be outside the S&P
500 index, one could argue that the
risk o f deal fa ilu re is p ro b ab ly
greater the smaller the target.
The Mergerstat Review (Mergerstat)
is a well regarded publication among
valuation analysts. It includes informa
tion about deal failure rates. At first
blush it would appear that Merger
stat’s data contradict the findings in
the previously m entioned research
papers. The Mergerstat data are sum
marized in the following table:16
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Gross
announcements
Cancellations
Cancellations %

7,469 8,136 9,924 10,522 10,841
166
153 141 171 182
2%
2%
1% 2% 2%

Mergerstat presents data in its year
book back to 1982, and cancellations
generally approximate less than 10%

each year. Over the past 10 years
cancellations were generally less
than 4%. Other detail in the Merger
stat yearbook, though, provides use
ful insights.17
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Gross
announcements 7,469 8,136 9,924 10,522 10,841
Cancellations
166
153
141
171
182
Cancellations %
2%
2%
2%
1%
2%
Publicly
411
463 372 448 488
traded sellers
Privately
3,683 3,714 4,916 5,385 5,744
owned sellers
Divestitures
2,691 3,188 3,560 3,570 3,375

The differences in cancellation
results would appear to be explained
by the nature of the data sets used in
each case. The academic research of
merger arbitrage is focused on trans
actions involving publicly traded sell
ers. Mergerstat’s data are dominated
by privately owned sellers and divesti
tures. Additionally, Mergerstat’s data
are obtained principally through
public announcem ents of transac
tions. This fact is important because
privately owned sellers (and to some
extent divestitures) are not subject to
the same disclosure requirements as
are publicly traded sellers. To be
sure, deals with privately owned sell
ers do fail, but those failures are far
less likely to be announced publicly.
Announcements of transactions with
private sellers (and many divesti
tures) are generally published once
the deal is completed, not while it is
p en d in g , unlike publicly tra d e d
sales. It is well known and widely
accepted that with privately owned
sellers and divestitures, the principals
involved are very reluctant to have
any inform ation about a pending
transaction “leaked” before it is actu
ally com pleted. The reasons most
often cited relate to employees (who
could leave if they know the com
pany’s being sold), customers (who

could get concerned about their
source of supply), and competitors
(who could try to use the announce
ment to their advantage). Although
further research is necessary to rec
oncile these differences, it would not
appear that the academic research of
merger arbitrage overstates transac
tion failure risk.

RISK DISCOUNT
Empirical research makes clear that
for publicly traded targets, the time
between deal announcem ent and
consummation is lengthy, and the
risk of deal failure is high. So it is logi
cal that arbitrageurs should reap a
benefit for assuming this risk in the
form of a disco u n t from the
announced deal price. In terms of the
m erger arbitrage market, this dis
count is known as the spread, and
empirical studies support its existence
and indicate that it is meaningful.
The study by Ben Branch and
Taewon Yang of collar merger offers
found that the spread between the
offer price and the market price one
day after the merger announcement
averaged roughly 9% for the transac
tions in their study.18 Micah Officer’s
study analyzed the spread from sev
eral perspectives with average spread
results ranging from 4%-6% gener
ally.19 However, these studies are
silent on the effect that dividends
have on the calculated spread, an
interesting question that should be
researched further.
It is important to note the differ
ences in the way each of the studies
mentioned in the previous paragraph
calculates the spread. The Branch/
Yang study calculates the initial
spread, which is the spread one day
after the merger announcement. The
study by Micah Officer captures the
average spread for a large num ber

13 Fich and Stefanescu, p. 17.
14 Micah Officer, “Are Performance Based Arbitrage Effects Detectable? Evidence From Merger Arbitrage” Working Paper, February 20, 2007, p. 15.
(http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=725322)
15 Fich and Stefanescu, p. 17.
16 Mergerstat Review 2007 Yearbook, FactSet Mergerstat LLC, p. 158.
1 7 Ibid. pp. 158,219.
18 Ben Branch and Taewon Yang, “Merger Deal Structures and Investment Strategies,” TheJournal ofAlternative Investments, Winter 2006, Exhibit 6.
19 Officer, Tables 4 & 5, Figure 1.
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of transactions th at are p en d in g
aro u n d large failed m ergers (the
purpose of his study was to determine
if average spreads are affected by the
failure of large high profile proposed
mergers). So, in the study by Micah
Officer, the spreads calculated could
span a wide tim e range after the
announcement of a merger. As Offi
cer notes in his working paper
M erger spreads differ between
deals and across time due to dealspecific characteristics. For exam
ple, the probability that a merger
proposal or tender offer will be
successfully consum m ated and
the probability that a higher com
peting bid will eventuate are both
factors that will cause spreads to
vary....Intuitively, spreads should
be narrower, but positive, when
the offer is more likely to be com
pleted and completed in a short
timeframe because arbitrageurs
are m ore likely to realize the
offered com pensation for their
shares quickly.20
The distinction in calculation
methods is im portant because one
would expect that the initial spread
should become narrower as a trans
action nears com pletion. T hat is
because the probability of deal failure
is expected to be greatest when the
transaction is first announced. As a
deal nears completion, risk of failure
should begin to subside, and the
spread should narrow. T here are
notable exceptions to this expecta
tion, and further research would be
useful to confirm this belief. But it
would seem fair to say that the study
method used by Micah Officer would
tend to produce lower spread results
than the m eth o d used in the
Branch/Yang study. Further research
is required to confirm this belief.
A dditionally, M icah O ffic e r’s
study indicates the existence of a size
effect re la te d to the s p re a d .21
Although the spread on the largest
20
21
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targets in one p a rt o f his study
ranged from 1%-3%, the spread for
the smallest targets approxim ated
7%. This finding is significant as it
relates to discounts for lack of mar
ketability because many valuation
practitioners assume that the smaller
the company, the less marketable it
is (all else being c o n sta n t). The
results of Officer’s study would seem
to support this conclusion.

APPLICATION TO DISCOUNTS FOR LACK OF
MARKETABILITY OF CONTROLLING
INTERESTS
Given the similarities between public
and private merger and acquisition
transactions, it would seem logical to
apply the findings from studies of
merger arbitrage to the valuation of
a privately held controlling owner
ship interest for the following rea
sons:
• T he studies cited re la te to
announced mergers and acquisi
tions, which are control indica
tions of value.
• Empirical research indicates that
merger announcements are a sign
of an illiquid valuation as the time
to realize the q u o ted price is
e x te n d e d , which is sim ilar in
acquisitions of privately held com
panies.
• Empirical research also indicates
that merger announcements are
subject to significant risk of fail
ure, similar to acquisitions of pri
vately held companies.
• Empirical research would indicate
that the risk the market attaches
to such illiquidity is significant,
from 4% -9% according to the
studies.
Based on the research reviewed, it
would appear that merger arbitrage
studies provide useful em pirical
research concerning the marketabil
ity of controlling ownership inter
ests. The average spread calculated
in the studies would seem to be an
appropriate measure to use in the

valuation of a controlling ownership
interest in a privately held company
to reflect its lack of marketability.
Merger arbitrage studies would also
seem to support the belief that, as
the level of ownership increases, so
does relative marketability. Empirical
research would seem to demonstrate
that discounts for lack of marketabil
ity are much larger for minority own
ership interests (35%-40% on aver
age) than are discounts related to
c o n tro llin g ow nership in te rests
(4% -9% on average). Finally,
merger arbitrage studies would seem
to support the belief that larger com
panies are more marketable than are
smaller companies (all else being
constant).

MORE RESEARCH NEEDED
Empirical research summarized in
this paper indicates that studies of
m erger arbitrage could be a rich
source of data in assessing the dis
count for lack of marketability associ
ated with co n tro llin g ow nership
interests. Further study is required,
though, before it can be accepted as
settled theory among practitioners.
The research cited in this article was
not specifically generated to address
the question of discounts for lack of
marketability for controlling inter
ests; it was focused on returns that
are generated in m erger arbitrage
trading strategies. However, results
of m erger arbitrage studies would
seem to indicate that it is a valid area
of research co n cern in g the m ar
ketability of controlling ownership
interests. X

Ronald D. DiMattia, CPA, ABV, CMA, is pres
ident of Corporate Value Partners, Inc. in
Rocky River, Ohio, (440) 333-1910. His firm
specializes in providing corporate finance
consulting services to small and midsized
businesses. The author would like to thank
Bob Duffy, Jim Alerding, and Bill Moran for
their helpful comments, with special thanks
to Kevin Yeanoplos for his consistent friend
ship and invaluable guidance.
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A BATTLE OF EXPERTS
HOLMAN V. COMMISSIONER
By La n ce S . H a ll, ASA
Thefollowing article appeared in The FMV Valuation Alert, a publication of
FMV Opinions, Inc. (http://www.fmv.com) and is reprinted with permission.
Over the past decade, the IRS has
achieved considerable success in Tax
Court attacking the seemingly ubiq
uitous family lim ited partnership
based upon Section 2036(a). Holman
v. Commissioner (May 27, 2008)
departs from the norm al Section
2036(a) script and, instead, attacks
this securities-holding FLP based on
Section 2703, with some success.123
More importantly, however, the ulti
mate value of the gifted partnership
interests hinged upon which valua
tion expert was better.

BACKGROUND
On November 3, 1999, the Holmans
formed a family limited partnership
(“Partnership”). A trust on behalf of
the children contributed 100 shares
of Dell Corp. stock, and Mr. and Mrs.
H olm an collectively co n trib u te d
70,000 shares of Dell Corp. stock. The
purpose of the partnership was four
fold: (1) long-term growth, (2) asset
preservation, (3) asset protection,
and (4) the ch ildren’s education.
Subsequent gifts to the children were
made on November 8, 1999, January
4, 2000, and February 2, 2001.
The Partnership agreement had
the normal prohibitions against trans
fer that are typically seen in family lim
ited partnerships. However, this Part
nership also had a buy-out clause for
any prohibited transfer that allowed
the Partnership to repurchase the
transferred shares at “its fair market
value based upon the assignee’s right
to share in distributions from the
partnership, as determ ined by an

appraisal performed by an indepen
dent appraiser....” Moreover, the Part
nership had the option to pay that
price at “ten percent (10%) of the
purchase price at closing and pay the
balance of the purchase price in five
equal annual installments...together
with interest at the Applicable Federal
Rate....”

COURT'S DECISION
T he IRS utilized th re e d ifferen t
attacks on the Partnership gifts: (1)
The gifts were actually indirect gifts of
Dell stock, (2) Section 2703 rendered
the transfer restrictions invalid, and
(3) the valuation discounts were
excessive.

INDIRECT GIFTS
The IRS argued that the Partnership
form ation and November 8, 1999
gift were in essence a gift of Dell
stock. The IRS based its argum ent
on Shepherd v. Commissioner,2 wherein
assets were contributed to a partner
ship and, as a result, the capital
accounts of all partners, including
the children, were increased, and on
Senda v. Commissioner,3 wherein the
partnership was form ed and gifts
made on the same day. Shepherd was
deem ed inapplicable because Hol
man differed in that contributions
were made to the partnership and
gifts of partnership interests were
subsequently made.
In regard to Senda, the Holman
court noted that the gift was of valid
partnership interests and that six days
had passed between the formation

and the gift. As a result, the Holman
Court stated, “We shall not disregard
the passage of time and treat the for
mation and funding of the partner
ship and the su b seq u en t gifts as
occurring simultaneously under the
step transaction doctrine.”

SECTION 2703
Section 2703(a) “...provides that, for
purposes of the gift tax, the value of
any property transferred by gift is
determ ined without regard to any
right or restriction...relating to the
property.” However, under 2703(b),
2703(a) does not apply if:
1. It is a bona fide business arrange
ment;
2. It is not a device to transfer such
property to members of the dece
dent’s family for less than full and
adequate consideration in money
or money’s worth; and
3. Its terms are comparable to similar
arrangements entered into by per
sons in an arm’s length transaction.
The Holman C ourt concluded,
“We find [the restrictio n s] do
not...constitute a bona fide business
arrangement within the meaning of
section 2703(b)(1).” Furthermore, if
the Partnership purchases a trans
ferred interest at “fair market value”
under the payment terms, other part
ners (including the remaining chil
d ren ) ben efit. A ccordingly, the
restrictions are “a device to transfer
LP units to the natural objects of
petitioners’ bounty for less than ade
quate consideration.” Because of the
violations of 2703(b)(1) and (2), the
Holman Court passed on determining
whether the restrictions were similar
to other business arrangements.

VALUATION DISCOUNTS
The valuation experts for both the
IRS and the taxpayer provided reports
which valued the gifted interests with
and without consideration of the Part
nership agreement restrictions. Both

1 130 T.C. No. 12 (Judge Halpern).
115 T.C. (2000), affd. 283 F.3d 1258 (11th Circuit 2002).
3 433 F.3d 1044 (8th Circuit 2006).
2
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parties started with the net asset value
of the Partnership. In considering dis
counts for lack of control, both parties
considered the discounts observed on
closed-end investment funds. The Hol
man Court favored the IRS’s expert’s
“m ore th o ughtful” approach and
determ ined m inority discounts of
11.32%, 14.24%, and 4.63%, respec
tively, for each of the gift dates. The
taxpayer’s expert’s minority discounts
were 14.4%, 16.3%, and 10% respec
tively.
In determining the discounts for
lack of marketability, both experts
used restricted stock data. However,
the IRS’s expert argued that, over
time, restricted stock discounts have
declined. He observed discounts
d eclining after 1990, when Rule
144A was introduced, expanding the
pool of qualified buyers, and after
1997, when the Rule 144 holding
period was reduced to one year from
two years. He argued that the 1990
relaxation of qualified buyer rules
established a m arket for restricted
stock, whereas before there was no
meaningful market. He also argued
that the reduction in discounts after
1997 was re la te d purely to the
reduced holding period. Based on
this a rg u m e n t, the IRS’s e x p e rt
claimed that the 12% differential
between the pre-1991 discounts and
the 1991 through 1996 discounts
reflected the discount associated
with creating a market (or the lack
thereof). Any additional discount
was purely related to changes in the
“holding period and factors unre
lated to marketability.”
The taxpayer’s expert emphasized
the lack of any market for the Part
nership interests versus a lim ited
market for restricted stock.
Accordingly, based on the
restricted stock data, “the discount for
lack of marketability should be at least
35% .” [Em phasis added by the
Court.] The Court interpreted the
taxpayer’s expert’s position as stating,
in essence, that the real discount
should be 100% because there is no

8

market and that the taxpayer’s expert
simply and “arb itrarily ” stopped
at 35%.
Again, the Holman Court favored
the IRS’s e x p e rt’s arg u m en t and
stated, “We agree with [the IRS’s
expert] that the holding period com
ponent of the marketability discount
is of little, if any, influence here.”
In addition to the novel interpreta
tion of the restricted stock data, the
IRS’s expert posited a restructuring
liquidation. In essence, if a partner
wanted out, the Partnership could dis
solve, transfer the Dell stock, pro rata,
to the exiting partner, and reconsti
tute the Partnership with the remain
ing partners. Although this seems to
depart from the fair m arket value
“hypothetical willing buyer/willing
seller” construct, the Holman Court
agreed with the IRS’s expert. Despite
noting that “such a transaction is per
haps inconsistent with the stated pur
pose of the partnership,” the Court
was in agreement that, “[s]o long as
the partnership’s assets remain highly
liquid, ... the rem aining partners
would appear to bear little or no eco
nomic risk in agreeing to a redemp
tion, or similar transaction, to accom
modate a wishing-to-assign partner.”
It comes as no surprise that the
Holman Court concluded, “.. .we can
not determine any better estimate of
an ap p ro p riate m arketability dis
count than [the IRS’s expert’s] 12.5
percent, and we find accordingly.”

WE DISAGREE
Our disagreement with the Holman
Court relates solely to the discount
for lack of marketability. Marketabil
ity is n o t an on and off switch.
Rather, the issue of marketability is
an issue of varying degrees of liquid
ity. Some assets have more liquidity
than other assets. Rule 144A did not
create a market for restricted stock.
In essence, there was a market for
restricted stock before Rule 144A.
Rule 144A m erely increased the
num ber of potential buyers, thus
increasing the liquidity of restricted

stock. Moreover, restricted stock and
the Partnership interests, after ignor
ing the restrictions, share one identi
cal attribute: The restricted stock
and the Partnership interests can be
sold at any time in a private place
ment. The restricted stock and Part
nership interests have one dissimilar
ity: After a relatively brief holding
period, restricted stock can be sold
in the public marketplace at no dis
count, while there is no such con
tractual brief holding period and
public sale available for the Partner
ship interest. There is only one possi
ble accurate conclusion and that, all
things being equal, is that restricted
stock of a public company is more
liquid than private stock. It always is
and always will be. Surprisingly, the
Holman Court found otherwise.
In any case, the issue of liquidity or
marketability for restricted stock can
not be separated from its holding
period. They are inextricably interre
lated.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
For estate planning professionals, two
lessons emerge from Holman. First,
opportunities to reduce value by hav
ing repurchase formulas utilizing pay
ments over time at the Applicable
Federal Rate in family limited partner
ships may be gone. The second lesson
is even more important: Choose your
expert wisely. Even with a ludicrous
claim that marketability is unassoci
ated with the h o lding p erio d of
restricted stock (i.e., restricted stock of
a public company is less liquid than
private stock), the IRS won because it
simply had the better expert.
Don’t count on a split-the-differ
ence Court. Get it right the first time.

Lance Hall is a managing director and co
founder of FMV Opinions, inc. with offices in
New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Irvine,
Chicago, Dallas, and St. Louis. He heads
FMV’s estate and gift tax valuation practice.
He can be contacted at lhall@fmv.com.
© 2 0 0 8 FMV Opinions, Inc.
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ANALYTICAL STRENGTHS AND
WEAKNESSES OF THE RELIEF FROM
ROYALTY METHOD
By A sh le y L. R e illy and R o b e rt F. R e illy , C P A / A B V

INTRODUCTION
There are four (and only four) types
of intellectual property: patents,
trademarks, copyrights, and trade
secrets. Intellectual property may be
subject to valuation, lost profits and
econom ic dam ages analysis, and
intercompany transfer pricing analy
sis. When there is adequate arm ’s
length license data available from
which to extract a market-derived
royalty rate, the valuation analyst will
often use the relief from royalty
method (the RFR method) of intel
lectual property valuation. The RFR
method may also be used to estimate
intellectual property-related eco
nomic damages and an intercom 
pany transfer price for intellectual
property.
This discussion summarizes the
four types of intellectual property
and the three types of intellectual
p ro p e rty econom ic analysis for
w hich the RFR m eth o d may be
applicable. In particular, this discus
sion will summarize the analytical
strengths and weaknesses of the RFR
m eth o d . T he v aluation analyst
should consider these analytical
stre n g th s an d w eaknesses when
using the RFR method for any type
of intellectual property royalty rate
analysis.

TYPES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
In contrast to the four types of intel
lectual property, there are numerous
types of commercial intangible assets.
Most commercial intangible assets
naturally come into existence in the
normal course of operations of indus
trial or commercial business. Exam
ples of such commercial intangible
assets include customer and client

relationships, supplier relationships,
and employee relationships (in the
form of an assembled workforce). In
contrast to general intangible assets,
intellectual property is created, pro
tected, commercialized, financed,
and exchanged under specific federal
or state statutes.
Patents

A patent is a document that is issued
by the U. S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO ). A p a te n t grants a
monopoly to the grantee (called the
inventor) for a limited time on the
use and developm ent of an inven
tion. The following three types of
patents are granted by the PTO:
Utility patents. There are five cate
gories of utility patents: (a) a
process p aten t, (b) a m achine
patent, (c) a manufacture patent,
(d) a composition of matter patent,
and (e) an im provem ent of an
existing idea patent.
Design patents. Design patents
relate to a nonfunctional part of a
functional manufactured product
(for example, a package design).
Plant patents. Plant patents relate
to asexually or sexually re p ro 
ducible plants.
P atents are p ro te c te d by the
Patent Act, which is included in Title
35 of the United States Code (USC)
at Sections 101-376.
Trademarks

A tradem ark is a distinctive word,
phrase, logo, graphic symbol, or
other device used to identify (and to
distinguish) a product or service.
Unlike a patent, a trademark is not
legally required to be registered.
However, most trademarks are regis
tered with the PTO.

The following are the five types of
trademark-related intangible assets:
1.Trademark. The m anufacturer’s
unique logos or symbols
2. Trade name. The manufacturer’s
name
3.Service mark. The service pro
vider’s unique logos or symbols
4. Service name. T he service
provider’s name.
5.Trade dress. A distinctive shape
or packaging related to a particu
lar product or service
Trademarks are protected by the
Lanham Act, which is included in
T itle 15 of the USC at Sections
1051-1127.
Copyrights

A copyright gives the owner of a cre
ative work (called the author) the
right to keep others from using that
work without the ow ner’s perm is
sion. It is noteworthy that the copy
right applies to the expression of an
idea, but not to the idea itself. In
other words, an idea (no matter how
original) cannot be subject to copy
right protection.
A creative work (called a work of
authorship) must meet the following
three criteria in order for the work
to qualify for a copyright. The work
must be
1. Original.
2. Fixed in a tangible m edium of
expression.
3. Produced by an exercise of human
intellect.
In order to create a copyright, the
author of the work may either place
a copyright notice on a published
work or register the work with the
U.S. Copyright Office. Copyrights
are protected by the Copyright Act
of 1976, which is included in Title 35
of the USC at Sections 101—376.
The owner of the copyright may
be an employee. However, when the
employee prepares a “work for hire,”
then the owner of the subject copy
right is the employer corporation.
The copyright may be on a literary
work, musical com position, film,
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Exhibit 1. Analytical Strengths of the RFR Method in
Intellectual Property Valuation
1. The royalty rate data are typically market-derived.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

a. The data come from actual arm's length intellectual property license transactions.
b. The data can be independently verified (or challenged) by the valuation analyst.
The RFR method valuation analysis is transparent.
a. All of the valuation analysis components are fairly obvious.
b. All of the valuation analyst judgments are fairly obvious.
The RFR method valuation analysis is mathematically straightforward.
a. The valuation analysis is relatively easy to explain to other parties.
b. The valuation analysis is relatively easy to replicate by other parties.
The RFR valuation methodology is consistent with actual commercial business practices.
a. Business people frequently enter into inbound or outbound intellectual property license agreements.
b. Business people frequently buy and sell intellectual property license agreements.
The RFR valuation methodology is consistent with the relevant judicial precedent.
a. The courts are familiar with this intellectual property valuation methodology.
b. The published judicial decisions indicate an acceptable range of intellectual property royalty rates.
The RFR valuation method has numerous analytical applications.
a. The RFR method may be used for various intellectual property valuation, transfer pricing, and

economic damages purposes.
b. The RFR method may be used for various intellectual property license negotiation and license financing

structures.
computer software, advertising copy,
em ployee m anuals and tra in in g
materials, product or process draw
ings, product catalogs, and other
internally g en erated com m ercial
materials.

Trade secrets are typically protected
by state statutes. Most state trade
secret statutes have generally adopted
the provisions of the Federal Uniform
Trade Secrets Protection Act and the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996.

Trade Secrets

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANALYSES

The owner of commercial informa
tion that provides a competitive edge
has a legal right to keep others from
using such information. A trade secret
can include any form ula, pattern,
physical device, idea, process, or com
pilation of information. There are two
requirements for such process infor
mation or other commercial informa
tion to qualify as a trade secret. They
are as follows:
• It must provide the owner with a
competitive advantage in the rele
vant marketplace.
• It must be treated by the owner in
a way so as to prevent the public
or com p etito rs from lea rn in g
about it.
T h ere is no legal reg istratio n
process with respect to trade secrets.

T here are three general types of
intellectual property royalty rate
analyses:
1. Valuation of the subject intellec
tual property
2. Transfer price estimate for the
subject intellectual property
3 Economic damages to the subject
intellectual property

10

Valuation

A valuation analyst may be called on
to perform a valuation of intellectual
property for numerous reasons. The
valuation analyst may begin the valu
ation en g ag em en t by asking the
intellectual property owner/operator if a recent valuation of the sub
ject intellectual property (conducted
for whatever purpose) already exists.

Some of the m ore com m on p u r
poses for intellectual property valua
tions include the following:
• Financial (fair value) accounting
(for example, for personal finan
cial statements)
• Federal income, gift, or estate tax
ation (for example, for a charita
ble contribution)
• Sale or license transactions (for
example, for intellectual property
sales or licenses)
• Financing collateral (for example,
for intellectual property sale of
collateralized loans)
• Bankruptcy and reorganization
(for example, when the intellec
tual property is collateral on a
secured debt)
• Equity allocation (for example, in
a corporation, joint venture, part
nership, or oth er organization
structure when one party has con
tributed intellectual property to
the organization)
• Litigation and dispute resolution
(for example, family law, infringe
ment, and dissipation of corpo
rate assets)
• C o rp o ra te g o v e rn a n c e a n d
strategic planning (for example,
identification of com m erciali
zation opportunities)
Transfer price estimate

There are also numerous instances
when a valuation analyst may be asked
to estimate an intellectual property
royalty rate transfer price for third
party transfer (for example, license)
purposes. The valuation analyst may
also inquire of the intellectual prop
erty ow ner/operator as to the exis
tence of recent intellectual property
royalty rate analyses. Even if such a
royalty rate analysis did not indicate a
value, the royalty rate transfer price
study may still be useful to the valua
tion analyst performing the valuation.
Some common intellectual property
transfer price study purposes include
the following:
• Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Sec
tion 482 planning and compliance
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•

•

•

•

•

related to intercompany transfers
of intangible property
License of the intellectual prop
erty from the owner/developer to
the third party developm ent or
commercialization entity
Private inurement considerations
(for exam ple, when a not-forprofit entity buys, sells, or licenses
intellectual property to or from a
for-profit entity)
Business unit cost accounting (for
exam ple, when one corporate
business unit uses an intellectual
property owned by another cor
porate business unit)
Unequal business ownership (for
example, when a wholly owned
business licenses in te lle c tu a l
property to or from a business
that is not wholly owned)
Intergenerational transfers (for
example, when a privately owned
corporation owned by one gener
ation licenses an intellectual prop
erty to or from an entity owned by
the next generation)

Economic damages

In numerous instances, a valuation
analyst may be asked to estimate lost
profits or some other m easure of
econom ic damages related to the
intellectual property ow ner/opera
tor involved in litigation or a similar
claim. These lost profits or eco
nomic damages analyses will likely
not conclude a value indication for
the subject intellectual property.
However, such a lost profits or eco
nom ic damages analysis may pro
vide useful qualitative and quantita
tive in te lle c tu a l p ro p e rty in fo r
mation to the valuation analyst who
is performing the valuation. Some
of the com m on litigation related
purposes for an economic damages
royalty rate analysis include the fol
lowing:
• Infringem ent of the intellectual
property
• Breach of contract related to the
intellectual property development
or exploitation
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Exhibit 2. Analytical Weaknesses of the RFR Method in
Intellectual Property Valuation
1. There are rarely perfect "comparable uncontrolled transactions" (CUT) intellectual property license agreements
on which the valuation analyst may rely.
a. The guideline intellectual property licenses may be in a different industry than the subject owner/operator

industry.

2.

b. The guideline intellectual property licenses may be for a different intellectual property type.
It is often difficult to adjust or normalize (or do both) the CUT intellectual property licenses.
a. Often, milestone or other fixed license agreement payments are not publicly disclosed.
b. Often, it is difficult to convert fixed license agreement payments to an intellectual property percentage-type

royalty rate.

3. The RFR method is not applicable in all instances.
a. Some types of intellectual property are not typically licensed or are not licensable.
b. The cost approach or the income approach may be more appropriate in some intellectual property valuation

instances.

4. The RFR method typically produces a downward-biased estimate of intellectual property value, transfer price, or
economic damages for the following reasons:
a. Guideline license agreement royalty rates may reflect limited intellectual property use rights only.
b. Guideline license agreement royalty rates may reflect value at the intellectual property license agreement

inception date.
c. Guideline license agreement royalty rates ignore other intellectual property licensee and licensor relation

ships.
d. Guideline license agreement royalty rates ignore other payments between the intellectual property licensee

and licensor.
e. Guideline license agreement royalty rates may include distressed or dispute settlement transactions, or

both.
f. Guideline license agreement royalty rates may reflect the subject intellectual property licensee value only

(but not the subject owner/operator value).
• Breach of a noncom pete agree
m ent involving the intellectual
property
• Expropriation of the intellectual
p ro p e rty by a go v ern m en tal
authority
• Tortious interference with the
business practices or business
opportunity
• D efam ation, slan d er, or libel
regarding a name-related intellec
tual property

RFR METHOD VALUATION FORMULA
The basic (or direct capitalization)
RFR m ethod intellectual property
valuation formula is as follows:
intellectual property value =

owner/operator revenue x royalty rate
discount rate - growth rate

This direct capitalization valuation
form ula is ap p ro p riate when the
intellectual property revenue stream

is a perpetuity, and the annual rate of
change in the intellectual property
revenue stream (whether positive or
negative) is constant. W hen these
two simplifying assumptions are not
appropriate, then the valuation ana
lyst will modify the direct capitaliza
tion valuation formula accordingly.
For a limited life owner/operator
revenue stream or a nonconstant
revenue growth rate, the valuation
analyst may have to use a yield capi
talization valuation formula. Alterna
tively, the valuation analyst may use
the direct capitalization model with
either a limited life present value of
annuity factor for the discount rate
or a weighted average of the various
grow th rate p ro je c tio n s as the
growth rate.
Regardless of whether the direct
capitalization form ula or the yield
capitalization form ula is used, the
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RFR method is based on the use of
market-derived royalty rates extracted
from the arm ’s length intellectual
property licenses. Therefore, the cred
ibility of the RFR method valuation
analysis is based on the credibility of
the intellectual property royalty rate
selection process.

ANALYTICAL STRENGTHS OF
THE RFR METHOD
Exhibit 1 on page 10 summarizes
the analytical strengths of the RFR
m eth o d of in te lle c tu a l p ro p erty
valuation. Many of these analytical
strengths apply directly to an intellec
tual property valuation perform ed
for virtually any purpose.

ANALYTICAL WEAKNESSES OF
THE RFR METHOD
Exhibit 2 on page 11 summarizes the
analytical weaknesses of the RFR
method of intellectual property valua
tion. Many of these analytical weak
nesses apply directly to an intellectual
property valuation performed for vir
tually any purpose. The valuation ana
lyst should consider all of these
methodological strengths and weak
nesses when using the RFR method in
any intellectual property valuation. X
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